Thomas and Lidia married in 2001 and Lidia filed for divorce in 2012. Their divorce proceedings were long and complicated, with lots of witnesses and volumes of exhibits. They involved a potential marital estate worth $150 million.
In 2013 the parties agreed to a bifurcated divorce decree, allowing their marriage to be dissolved at that time. The court ruled that the assets would be valued at the date of the bifurcated divorce decree but reserved all other issues for trial.
Their divorce trial took sixteen days and was conducted on various dates between November 2017 and December 2018.
The matter came under advisement awaiting a final ruling in January 2020, although the court continued to hold status conferences as issues arose, with the most recent being in July 2020.
Thomas passed away on August 2, 2020. The next day, the Court issued a ruling stating it would close the divorce action in twenty days unless it received a valid objection with a supporting memorandum.
Lidia objected. She filed a Motion for Entry of a Final Property Division and a Rule 25 Motion to Substitute Party. In her motion, Lidia requested that the personal representative or other appropriate person be substituted for Thomas in the divorce action in order to allow the Court to issue a final ruling on property division and other issues. Thomas’s attorney opposed Lidia’s objection and motion.
The Court held oral arguments on the issues. In February 2021 the Court stated that shortly before Thomas’s death, it had completed its findings of fact and that it planned to reserve only one outstanding issue that it would invite the parties to address at a supplemental hearing.
The Court gave a lengthy discussion of Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, 416 P.3d 487, which is a Utah case on what happens when a party to a divorce dies before the divorce becomes final.
However, the Court ruled that its prior orders regarding child support, parent time and custody abated upon Thomas’s death and that Lidia, as the surviving party in the bifurcated divorce, was required to pursue her unresolved equitable claims regarding marital property in a probate court.
A few months later, the Court issued a Final Order stating that due to Thomas’s untimely death, the Court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter and that the case was closed.
Lidia appealed, arguing that the Court erred in ruling that Thomas’s death caused it to lose jurisdiction over the divorce case.
The Court had relied heavily on the Porenta case in issuing its ruling. In the Porenta case the husband had signed a quit claim deed transferring his interest in the marital home to his mother while the divorce case was pending. He had done so in an attempt to prevent the home from being distributed as part of the marital estate.
The husband thereafter died, causing the divorce court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The wife then sued the mother under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act. The court ruled that the husband’s transfer to his mother was fraudulent under UFTA.
The mother appealed, arguing that an ongoing debtor creditor relationship was required under UFTA, which was extinguished when the husband died. She claimed that the wife’s claim was for the entire marital estate (“a claim for equitable division arises when one party in a marriage threatens divorce”) and that she could not bring a claim against a dead person. She further argues that court orders that award a spouse with property abate upon the death of a spouse.
But the Court cited its ruling in In re Harper’s Estate, 265 P. 2d 1005 (Utah 1984), which held that insofar as the status of a marriage is concerned, a spouse’s death abates a divorce action because the personal relationship between the parties is terminated by the death. However, the death does not abate the action itself and to the extent property rights are determined by the decree it remains effective and becomes final.
In re Harper’s Estate had clarified as mere non-binding dictum the seemingly ironclad ruling of Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884 (1975) which seemed to hold that when one of the parties dies before a divorce becomes final, no Decree of Divorce can be entered.
Conversely, interlocutory orders, such as orders restraining the parties from selling or dissipating marital assets abate upon the dismissal of a divorce case.
This rule was in line with that in the majority of jurisdictions that when a spouse dies during a divorce proceeding and during the time an appeal is pending or during the time an appeal may be taken a divorce action abates with respect to marital status but not with respect to property interests affected by the decree.
Finally, the Court had held that claims that survive the death of a party are typically chargeable against the party’s estate and cited Rule 25(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a means by which such a claim may be pursued.
Because the Court presumed that the wife’s claim for the whole of the marital estate, including the preservation of the joint tenancy in the marital home was not extinguished and was still valid, the Court held that a debtor-creditor relationship existed between the wife and the husband’s estate at the time the wife filed her UFTA claim.
As it pertained to the instant case, the Court saw the Porenta case as presenting three key takeaways:
1. With respect to the marital status, the death of a spouse abates the divorce action because death has already terminated the spouses’ personal relationship.
2. Court orders entered prior to the final divorce decree determining the property rights of the parties do not abate on the spouse’s death. However, any interlocutory orders that are effective only during the litigation abate upon the dismissal of a divorce action.
3. Certain unresolved claims or rights arising from a divorce action may still be pursued following the spouse’s death.
Because the issue had not been adequately briefed, the Porenta court did not decide the issue of whether or not unresolved claims (as opposed to orders) for equitable distribution or other property claims abate upon a spouse’s death. The Porenta court had characterized this as an issue of first impression in Utah.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals in the instant case (Mower v. Mower) did not have the need to address this issue of unresolved claims.
Unlike in the Porenta case, however, the husband in the Mower case had died after the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved by the bifurcated decree of divorce. Therefore. The Court did not need to decide the effect a spouse’s death has on the underlying claim for equitable distribution of the marital estate in the situation where the parties are still married at the time of the spouse’s death. In the Mower case, the ground in which the Porenta divorce case had abated — mootness — was not present.
This was because at the time of Thomas’s death, both parties had already remarried, and his death had no legal effect on the parties’ already dissolved marriage.
Utah courts may enter bifurcated divorces pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly where complex issues and potentially lengthy proceedings are at stake. See Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App. 30, ¶ 8, 996 P. 2d 565. And a Utah court’s jurisdiction to enter equitable orders with respect to property belonging to the marital estate is unaffected by the bifurcation. After all, the Utah Constitution states that “the district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute[.] Utah Const., art. VIII, ¶ 5. In addition, Utah divorce courts are “well established as courts of equity that retain jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter for the purposes equity may demand.” Potts v. Potts, 2018 UT App. 169, ¶ 13, 436 P.3d 263.
In the instant case mootness, a jurisdictional bar (see Legg v. Legg, 2016 UT App. 168, ¶ 25, 380 P.3d 360), did not apply to most of the claims at issue because the parties’ marriage was already dissolved at the time of Thomas’s death.
The Court therefore concluded that the district court had erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over all claims that remained in the matter and dismissing the divorce action in that ground.
In essence, the Court of Appeals held that once a decree of divorce is entered and thereafter one of the parties dies, the court can continue the equitable distribution of marital property.
The Court observed in a footnote that not all the claims in the divorce involves equitable distribution of marital property, or property rights. Other claims, such as for custody, child support and parent time abated upon Thomas’s death. The district court was instructed on remand to dismiss any non-property claims that were rendered moot by Thomas’s death.
The Court noted that whether or not to substitute a party is within a court’s discretion. The Court also noted that a court has inherent authority to abstain from issuing a ruling where another court (such as a probate court in the instant case) has concurrent jurisdiction. The Court observed, however, that it may be prudent upon remand, for the divorce trial court not to punt to the probate court but to proceed with its final distribution of marital property order given that it had already prepared a ruling on the issue and that the marital estate might only constitute a portion of Thomas’s vast estate.
The Court noted that a court may consider a substitution of parties where a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished. It held that the district court should reconsider Lidia’s Motion for Entry of Final Property Distribution and Rule 25 Motion to Substitute a Party.
See Mower v. Mower, 2023 UT App 10.
This material should not be construed as legal advice for any particular fact situation but is intended for general informational purposes only. For advice specific to any individual situation, an experienced attorney should be contacted.