Paul and Pauline Sauer were married in 1987 and Paul filed for divorce in 2013. Following a bench trial in which Pauline represented herself pro se, the district court awarded Pauline one-half of Paul’s retirement account and $576 per month in alimony. Paul appealed.

Paul argued on appeal that Pauline had not requested alimony and that, therefore, the Court abused its discretion in awarding it. But the record showed otherwise. While Pauline did not appear to understand the meaning of the word alimony, she clearly understood that she needed money to live on and that she deserved such an award.

The Court noted that alimony is intended, to the extent possible, to maintain the parties in the standard of living that prevailed during the marriage and to prevent one of the parties from becoming a public charge. The standard of living at the time the parties separated is typically the standard that is applied.

Paul claimed that the Court erred in imputing to Pauline higher expenses than she had claimed on her financial declaration which she presented into evidence. He cited the case of Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, claiming that it stood for the principle that a Court may not impute expenses to a party where that party has evidence with respect to his or her expenses. But the Court disagreed, stating that a trial court judge may impute expenses where no credible evidence on that issue is presented.

In this particular case, Pauline had grossly underestimated her housing expense, claiming it was only $400 per month. But she was staying at a friend’s trailer and the Court found there was no evidence how long this situation would continue. The Court noted that it is commonplace in a divorce for a party to live temporarily with family or friends, but the lack of actual current housing expenses did not prevent the court from imputing a reasonable housing expense based on market conditions.

Paul himself had claimed a housing expense of $975 per month, and it was well within the trial court’s discretion to impute the same amount to Pauline.

Moreover, the Court noted that the trial court judge had imputed income to Pauline in the amount of $1,517 per month based on her apparent historical earning capacity, despite the fact that she claimed only $189 in monthly income from food stamps. This benefited Paul and was not complained of.

In addition to the alimony issue, Paul also complained that the trial court had erred in discrediting his testimony regarding the value of several items of personal property. He claimed that his testimony had not been refuted by Pauline at trial and that, therefore, the court was bound to accept his testimony. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that issues of credibility are best determined by the trial court, which has the opportunity to observe the parties’ demeanors and various other subtle factors that are not easily apparent to an appellate court in the cold record. It is well-established that a court is not bound to accept a party’s testimony simply because it is uncontradicted. Such testimony must be “given such weight and credibility as the trier of fact finds reasonable under the circumstances.” Fullmer v. Fullmer, 2015 UT App 60 paragraph 25, 347 P.3d 14.

See Sauer v. Sauer, 27 UT App 114.

This material should not be construed as legal advice for any particular fact situation, but is intended for general informational purposes only. For advice specific to any individual situation, an experienced attorney should be contacted.