A new Utah Supreme Court case gives guidance on how to determine whether a criminal defendant is in custody for purposes of the Miranda warnings.
Miranda rights are named after the U.S. Supreme Court case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The famous Miranda warnings must be read to a person who is in custody before questioning them about a criminal matter. Otherwise, it is possible that any confession or self-incriminating statements the suspect makes may be suppressed as evidence in the case.
These well-known Miranda warnings are: 1) you have the right to remain silent, 2) anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law, 3) you have the right to an attorney, 4) if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.
Because Miranda is a federal constitutional case, states must be careful to be in lockstep with federal law with respect to its application.
In the case of State of Utah v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, the defendant was driven by his father to the police station for questioning. He was escorted to a room in which the door was closed, but as far as he knew, it was not locked. The detective told him at the beginning of the interview that he was free to leave at any time. He further stated that he knew the defendant’s father was outside in his car waiting for the defendant at any time he wished to leave. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and that his questioning was voluntary.
At no point during the interview was the defendant given the Miranda warnings.
As the interview progressed, two different police officers entered and left the room several times; however, they were each dressed in plain clothes. At no time during the interview were both officers in the interrogation room at the same time; i.e., there was no “good cop/bad cop” or “false friend” routine.
The defendant made several inconsistent statements during the course of the interview and at some point he acknowledged that he had gotten himself into some trouble with his statements and that he would probably end up in jail.
Ultimately the defendant confessed to a crime. At the end of the interview, he was officially arrested and charged with a crime.
Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his confession, arguing that he was in custody during the interview and that he was not read his Miranda rights.
The Miranda case rests on the principle that the state shoulders the entire burden of proving a criminal case and may not resort to the “cruel or simple expedient of compelling (evidence from a defendant’s) own mouth.” This idea derives from the Fifth Amendment’s right against being compelled to be a witness against oneself; i.e., the right against self-incrimination.
Defendant’s Motion was denied by the district court. In its denial, the court relied on the case of Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983), which sets out four prominent factors for determining whether a suspect is in custody; namely: 1) the site of the interrogation (station house questioning, while more suspect, does not automatically equate to custodial interrogation); 2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; 3) whether objective indicia of arrest were present; and 4) the length and form of interrogation.
In the instant case, the Utah Supreme Court rebuked sole reliance on the Carner factors in determining whether a suspect was in custody. This is because the United States Supreme Court had recently set forth the two-step test for determining if a suspect is in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings before questioning. Sole reliance on the Carner factors is inconsistent with this two-step test.
Under this two-step analysis, “the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable [person] would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” If the answer to this question is yes, then the next question is “whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012).
In determining whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or not, the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation must be examined. The Supreme Court declined to demarcate a “limited set of circumstances” which must be looked at. Rather, all of the relevant circumstances must be examined. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the “reasonable person” standard is an objective one. Thus, the suspect’s subjective beliefs or feelings as to whether or not he was free to leave are irrelevant.
Utah’s Supreme Court clarified that strict reliance on the Carner factors is inconsistent with this totality of the circumstances test as set out by the U.S. Supreme Court. Although the Carner factors may have some relevance to the totality of the circumstances test, they are not sufficient in and of themselves to determine the issue of custody.
Under the totality of the circumstances test in the Fullerton case, the Court concluded that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would have felt free to leave. Thus, the Court upheld the district court’s denial of Fullerton’s Motion to Suppress.
See State of Utah v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49.
This material should not be construed as legal advice for any particular fact situation, but is intended for general informational purposes only. For advice specific to any individual situation, an experienced attorney should be contacted.
