A 56 year old diabetic woman who underwent coronary bypass surgery in 1980 and suffered a stroke during her surgery, applied for disability, alleging statutory blindness.
She had enough quarters of credit from her prior work to achieve “fully” insured status. However she did not have 20 quarters of work credits in the 40 quarter period ending with the quarter of her alleged disability. Therefore, she did not have “special” insured status. Thus, she could only qualify for disability insurance benefits based on her visual impairment if she could prove that she was statutorily blind.
Statutory blindness is defined as central visual acuity in the better eye of 20/200 or less with the use of a corrective lens. The statute also provides that an eye which has a limited field of vision such that the widest diameter of the visual field subtends an angle of no greater than 20 degrees has a central visual acuity of 20/200 or less.
After suffering her heart attack and recovering from her stroke, the claimant was left with neurological damage that impaired her vision. Although her visual fields were still intact, she had a central visual acuity in each eye of approximately 20/50. This did not meet the statutory standard for blindness.
However, the claimant had neurological impairment that limited her ability to process visual information, especially in a moving environment. She frequently stumbled and fell when she walked, could not walk uneven surfaces or use an escalator, and could not see well enough to fasten a staple to the corner of a piece of paper. Three experts in ophthalmology opined that she was “functionally blind.”
The Secretary denied her claim and she appealed to the federal district court. The district court upheld the agency’s decision. She appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In her appeal the claimant argued that Congress could not have intended to award benefits to those who are effectively blind because of damage to their eyes while denying benefits to those who are effectively blind because of damage to the brain. But the Court rejected this argument because of the plain language of the statute.
Noting standards for statutory interpretation, the Court found that the statute must be interpreted literally and narrowly because there was no evidence of any contrary congressional intent. The Court declined to engraftment an additional judicial gloss onto the plain language of the statute.
The claimant request an appeal to the Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case.
This was the case of Adams v. Bowen, 872 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, _______ U.S. ________, 110 S. Ct. 151 (1989).
The result is set out in Social Security Ruling (SSR) 99-5c.
This material should not be construed as legal advice for any particular fact situation, but is intended for general informational purposes only. For advice specific to any individual situation, an experienced attorney should be contacted.
