Marianne Tyson filed a petition to unseal the adoption records of her 1978 adoption. She argued that she had good cause to unseal the adoption case because her doctor had requested information about her family medical, genetic and social history in order to understand whether she had any genetic predispositions.

The Utah Legislature has enacted some policy measures regarding adoptions. This includes a provision that adoption cases are sealed from public view for a period of one hundred years. UTAH CODE § 78B-6-141(2), (3)(e).

However, the Utah Legislature has also specified that adoption records may be opened for inspection upon a showing of “good cause.” Id. at § 78B-6- 141(3)(c).

But the Legislature did not define “good cause.” Rather, it left that issue up to the discretion of the courts. The Court set forth Rule 107(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule instructs a court to determine “whether the petitioner has shown good cause and whether the reasons for disclosure outweigh the reasons for non-disclosure.”

The district court determined that Tyson had now shown good cause. The court held that good cause requires something more than a general desire to learn one’s family, medical, genetic, or social history unrelated to a specific condition.

Tyson appealed.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the decision, agreeing with Tyson that the lower court erred in defining good cause.

Tyson’s arguments on appeal were threefold:

First, she argued that “in every adoption the best interest of the child should govern” and that standard should apply to her petition. (Quoting UTAH CODE § 78B-6-102(1).).

The Supreme Court held, however, that the best interest standard did not trump the “good cause” standard. This is because rules of statutory interpretation require that a court prefer a specific statutory instruction over a general one when the two are in conflict. The “best interest” standard is a general statutory instruction, but in order to unseal an adoption, the legislature has adopted the more specific “good cause” standard.

Tyson also contended that the district court’s interpretation of the “good cause” standard was in error.

The Supreme Court noted that when confronted with an undefined “good cause” standard, the courts have discretion to determine what constitutes “good cause.” The Court cited Reisbeck v. HCA Health Services of Utah, Inc. as instructive. See 2000 UT 48, ¶¶ 5–15, 2 P.3d 447

In that case, the Court refused to “establish any specific criteria for determining good cause” because “the assessment of the justifications offered by a moving party will remain highly fact-intensive, and because any given justification may entail aspects both within and beyond the moving party’s control.” Id. ¶¶ 14–15.

The problem with the instant case was that the district court adoption a specific legal standard for defining “good cause”, namely, that it requires something more than a mere desire to know one’s medical, genetic, and social history unrelated to any specific condition.

Tyson also contended that the district court failed to balance her interest in unsealing the adoption versus the birth mother’s interest in privacy.

The Supreme Court agreed with Tyson. Because the district court had established a specific criterion for “good cause” and found that Tyson did not meet that “good cause” standard, it had already foreclosed a balancing of interests by holding that Tyson’s interest was not legitimate.

The Court remanded the case to the district court for a correct interpretation of Utah Code 78B-6-141(3)(c) and to conduct a Rule 107 balancing that balanced the competing interests of the birth mother’s right to privacy and the adult adoptee’s right to information.
See In the matter of the adoption of M.A., 2024 UT 6.

This material should not be construed as legal advice for any particular fact situation, but is intended for general informational purposes only. For advice specific to any individual situation, an experienced attorney should be contacted.